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It is easy to imagine how you could smuggle adiamond. A diamond is small enough to be heldin the hand, carried in the body, or hidden in
the seam of a jacket or the heel of a shoe. It is con-
siderably less easy to imagine how someone smug-
gles a tanker-full of oil. Yet that is an everyday
occurrence in Nigeria, one
of the world’s leading oil
producers. Clearly, it can be
done only with the collu-
sion, at the very least, of very senior government
officials and officers of the armed forces, the navy
in particular. 
Corruption is notoriously hard to measure or
even to define, and therefore it is impossible to say
for certain whether corruption in Africa is increas-
ing or whether it is worse than in other places.
What can be said is that it has become astonishingly
brazen in recent years, with senior officials and
even heads of state quite openly flouting their own
countries’ laws and a range of international diplo-
matic and legal conventions.
In the early 1990s, officials in Kenya succeeded
in forging their own national currency. Senior
Kenyan officials also have been implicated in the
so-called Goldenberg scandal, named after a front
company that was used to defraud the public trea-
sury of some $600 million by claiming government
subsidies for nonexistent exports of probably
nonexistent gold and diamonds. Among those
recently recommended for prosecution are a for-
mer head of Kenyan intelligence, a former gover-
nor of the central bank, and a former head of the
treasury. One of the main architects of the scam has
testified that he gave the head of state, Daniel arap
Moi, suitcases full of money, and that he “never vis-
ited Moi empty-handed.”
When Kenyans eventually voted Moi’s party out
of office in 2002 in favor of a government pledged
to ending corruption, the new team used exactly
the same technique. Last year, the administration
of President Mwai Kibaki was exposed by its own
anticorruption chief, the courageous John
Githongo, as having paid millions of dollars to fic-
titious companies or to real companies that were
inflating invoices for government contracts. This
was done with the full knowledge of key ministers
who are themselves suspected of pocketing a big
share of the proceeds. Githongo reported his find-
ings to President Kibaki. The president has done
precisely nothing. 
In Liberia, the transitional government that ran
the country until the end of 2005 is believed to
have presided over the theft of some $100 million
per year, compared with an annual budget of a
mere $80 million, even while it was being moni-
tored by a very substantial United Nations mission.
In other words, this was a government that stole
more than it put into the state treasury—and this
at a time when Liberia is widely recognized as hav-
ing its last chance to lay the foundation for a
decent system of government after 15 years or
more of war and mayhem.
These and a distressing number of other exam-
ples suggest why, when it comes to graft, some
African countries have earned a reputation for
excess, and even for being beyond caring what oth-
ers may think. No doubt this is why the “corrup-
tion perceptions index” prepared by the watchdog
group Transparency International consistently
places African countries among the worst offend-
ers. A grim joke in Nigeria—which for some years
was the second most-corrupt nation on the Trans-
parency International list—held that the country
had avoided being ranked as the world’s most cor-
rupt by bribing Bangladesh to take over the slot.
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“In broad swaths of Africa many types of corrupt practice are not the deviant
behavior of a small minority—they are a standard mode of transacting political
and financial business.”
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THE UNLAWFUL STATE
Not only is there no consensus on precisely what
corruption is, but some of the more monstrous
cases of corruption can also be called by other
names. If a head of state bribes soldiers from the
army or officers from the intelligence service to
murder his personal enemies, this may indeed be
corruption, but it is also conspiracy to murder. If,
as in the Goldenberg scam, a businessman with
excellent links to government officials colludes with
them in securing payments for nonexistent services,
it is not only corruption, it is also fraud.
Some African heads of state do not limit them-
selves to demanding kickbacks for awarding state
contracts, which is probably the most common
form of official corruption, or extending their pro-
tection to professional criminals in return for pay-
ment. A handful have gone beyond forms of
collusion like these to become the main organizers
of syndicates that are smuggling drugs, guns, or
other illicit goods on a large scale. They bring to
this business all the advantages of state sovereignty:
diplomatic bags, diplomatic passports, access to
central banks for laundering money, exemption
from prosecution, and much more. 
In situations like this, observers need to ask
themselves what precisely they are dealing with. Is
it a problem of corrupt practices among public offi-
cials? Or is it a case of professional criminals hav-
ing taken control of a state, and using it simply as
a tool of the trade? 
Pursuing this line of thought may lead to histor-
ical reflections on the difference between a state and
a criminal conspiracy. This reflection need not be
unduly cynical. The sociologist Charles Tilly has
pointed out that the states that emerged in Europe
three or four centuries ago did so largely because of
their single-mindedness in organizing armies. To do
this, they required finance, which in turn involved
raising money from their people. Crudely put, early
modern states proposed to their subjects a deal no
different from a mobster’s unrefusable offer: pay us
money, and we will protect you; fail to pay us, and
we will rob you.
Associated in European history with the rise of
strong states with formidable powers of coercion are
countervailing struggles for democracy, freedom of
speech, and human rights. The law of habeas cor-
pus and the principle of no taxation without repre-
sentation were not granted by benign rulers out of
the goodness of their hearts, but were negotiated
after hard-fought contests. States became both
leviathans that could crush dissent and the guaran-
tors of contracts between rulers and ruled. Those
who refused the agreements they offered became
rebels or criminals. 
In light of this view of Western history, it
becomes still less clear what the exact nature of
corruption is in Africa, a continent where modern
states have other origins and the struggles of rulers
and ruled have taken different forms. In Africa
today, ordinary people regularly give bribes to
obtain the services they should in theory receive
from the state for free, or to police officers who
shake down travelers as a matter of course. In
Kenya it is estimated the average urban resident
pays 16 bribes per month. Junior officials in many
countries routinely take bribes to compensate
themselves for ludicrously small salaries. Politi-
cians raise money corruptly to fund their cam-
paigns. International businessmen collude in these
practices to obtain the contracts they want. Cor-
ruption becomes a way of life, a mode of business
and politics. “It is simple,” a West African civil ser-
vant once explained, “the government pretends to
pay us, and we pretend to work.”
STANDARD PRACTICE
None of these practices is unknown in the United
States, of course. Their particularity in the case of
sub-Saharan Africa is not a matter of scale: the
biggest African scams are puny in comparison to
Enron, the Texas energy corporation that engaged in
massive fraud. Rather, it is a question of context.
The word “corruption” implies deviation from a
norm, a falling away from accepted standards.
Hence, when certain types of illicit transactions
become normal to the point that people do not
bother to hide them, it is not satisfactory simply to
label them as “corruption” or even “crime.” This is
especially so when the people who run the state are
themselves the main organizers of such activity. As
we have seen, evidence from Nigeria and Kenya sug-
gests that outrageously corrupt practices have
become routine at the very heart of government in
some of the continent’s most important countries.
Even in South Africa, which has the biggest econ-
omy in Africa and is generally regarded as the lead-
ing power south of the Sahara, there are signs that
corruption exists deep inside the institutions of
state. In 1998, no fewer than 10,000 of the country’s
140,000 police officers were under investigation for
bribery, theft, or involvement in organized crime.
These figures are related to the fact that South
Africa’s transition from apartheid in the early 1990s
made it temporarily vulnerable to sophisticated pro-
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fessional criminals from other parts of the world,
who found it a convenient location both to organize
their activities and to launder their profits.
Overall levels of recorded crime in South Africa
have declined slightly in recent years, but accord-
ing to a survey in 2003, petty corruption is now the
most common offense after housebreaking. And yet
international diplomats and businesspeople con-
tinue to see South Africa as one of Africa’s few “nor-
mal” states—in the sense that it has a functioning
government, a central bank and financial institu-
tions that are able to offer a conducive business
environment, and a legal system that, creaky
though it is, is capable of producing satisfactory and
enforceable judgments in commercial disputes. 
The observation that corruption is entrenched in
such leading countries as Kenya and Nigeria, and
that it remains a definite problem even in South
Africa, makes it still more disturbing to contemplate
what this suggests about the continent’s more obvi-
ously dysfunctional states,
those commonly consid-
ered as “failed” or “fail-
ing.” It is important to
recall that even these coun-
tries have legal codes, at
least on paper. The prob-
lem is that the laws in
Africa’s dysfunctional states are rarely enforced, 
or only very selectively. Worse, the authorities 
theoretically responsible for their implementation
may themselves break these same laws continuously
and routinely.
This is really what Africa’s so-called failed states
are—not so much places where the state has ceased
to exist, but where the formal trappings of state-
hood serve purposes of strategic deception, rather
like the stage-sets in a theater. In one of these coun-
tries, you would have to be naïve to believe that the
law, the police, or the central bank really fulfills the
role in theory allotted to it. The Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Guinea-
Bissau, and dozens of other African states cannot
be regarded as functioning according to interna-
tional norms. But each one nevertheless has an
actual, substantive system of politics and gover-
nance—not to be confused with the formal system,
although the real and the legal are intertwined.
Anyone who wants to live or do business in a
failing state needs to learn the real rules. In each
case, the actual conventions of economic, political,
and even social life will certainly involve patterns
of activity regarded by many international observers
as corrupt. In broad swaths of Africa many types of
corrupt practice are not the deviant behavior of a
small minority—they are a standard mode of trans-
acting political and financial business.
THE HISTORY OF GRAFT
To understand the real political economy of cor-
ruption requires an appreciation of moral reper-
toires, which inevitably requires making historical
inquiries. Situating corruption within a specific
historical context suggests that certain illicit prac-
tices, even if they are formally outlawed, may be
considered morally permissible by large numbers
of people in some circumstances. (Americans
should know this as well as anyone, after the expe-
rience of Prohibition in the 1920s.) The law and
popular perceptions of morality do not always
coincide in their views. 
Probing how people’s understandings of partic-
ular types of action change over time has been
made more difficult by
the popularity of the dan-
gerously simplistic “clash
of civilizations” theory
made famous by Samuel
Huntington, which sug-
gests that cultural blocs
are rather impervious to
change. In reality, cultures are both more complex
and more fluid than that. In the case of Africa, an
investigation along these lines throws a good deal
of light on the phenomenon of “failing” states,
showing them to be not only derogations from
international models of good governance, but also
places shaped by their individual pasts.
A leading historian, John Lonsdale, once made
the striking observation that “the most distinctively
African contribution to human history could be
said to have been precisely the civilized art of living
fairly peaceably together not in states.” This remark
may remind us that it is indeed possible for people
to live together in reasonable harmony without
modern states—although whether that is possible
in the twenty-first century is another question.
It also provides clues to the historical trajectory
of various types of transaction that are often classed
today as corrupt. In many cases, these activities
have historical antecedents in practices deeply
rooted in African societies. Examples include the
accumulation of political power and social prestige
mainly through patronage; an expectation that rich
people will redistribute wealth to their family and
other dependents; and a long history of “extraver-
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People who have served as state officials
are expected by their own families to
enrich themselves through corruption.
sion”—the habit of seeking external resources to
build political power within African societies. 
Culture in Africa has long been a political bat-
tleground. During colonial times, European officials
claimed a right to rule Africa on the grounds that
their culture was superior. Europeans knew how to
organize the type of literate bureaucracies that are
at the heart of modern government, whereas
Africans had had little or no prior experience with
this kind of rule.
Slightly later, the claims of African nationalists that
they had a right to govern themselves were often
based on a simple inversion of the colonial prejudice
that Africans were unfit for self-government for cul-
tural reasons. African intellectuals could reply that
Africa, like every other continent, had its own
genius that should be celebrated rather than being
a source of embarrassment. After the establishment
of the United Nations and a world order based on a
system of sovereign states, African leaders could
also riposte that every nation in any case had a right
to sovereignty.
More than 40 years after most African countries
acquired sovereign status, these cultural disputes
still resonate. Indeed, so politicized does the con-
cept of culture remain with regard to Africa that the
mere mention of it risks causing immediate misun-
derstanding. Of course, observing that a practice
has historical roots—in other words, that roughly
similar things have occurred previously—does not
automatically make it acceptable in our own times.
European and American histories are full of exam-
ples of historically existing practices that were once
considered legitimate but are now seen as distaste-
ful, unrespectable, or illegal. It does not require
more than a few moments’ reflection to come up
with examples. The same should be true of Africa—
were it not that Africa is so often thought by both
its admirers and its detractors to exist in a timeless
present of African authenticity.
Some practices considered as corrupt occupy a
prominent place in such a schema, and corrupt
politicians are not above invoking an imagined
authenticity to excuse their behavior. According to
the Liberian writer Emmanuel Dolo, people who
have served as state officials are expected by their
own families to enrich themselves through corrup-
tion. Otherwise, he writes, they are accused of fail-
ing to do what he calls “the cultural thing”: to steal
money from the national treasury, an action they
may justify on cultural grounds.
In short, corruption has deep roots. If we are to
understand it and various related phenomena,
including state failure, it is urgent to investigate
what has happened over time. In Africa’s case, the
matters to be considered include a history of power
organized on a basis rather different from that in
Europe or North America. A moment in Africa’s his-
tory that is particularly relevant for the present dis-
cussion was the imposition in colonial times of
territorial, bureaucratically governed states that
aspired to establish the rule of law. 
THE RULE OF LAW
At this point, it should be made clear what is
meant by the establishment of the rule of law in
colonial times. Emphatically, this does not mean
that colonial government was a just order. It is no
more and no less than the observation that colo-
nial government was based on the idea that a cen-
tralized state apparatus should be responsible for
promulgating a code of laws and associated rules,
usually in written form, that have a binding force
on society and even on the state itself. This, we
may note in passing, makes thinkable the idea of
a state crime.
Nor does the colonial establishment of the rule
of law mean that public life has been governed ever
since by the consistent application of written laws.
The point is that from colonial times, and up until
today, African countries are in theory governed by
the consistent application of written laws. This
point is important in part because it allows African
politicians and power brokers and their foreign
partners or collaborators to manipulate the gap
between theory and reality to their advantage. 
The preceding observation on the rule of law
should also not be taken to suggest that African
societies before colonial times were chaotic
because they lacked the rule of law. In Africa’s case,
European colonial officials and a couple of gener-
ations of anthropologists tried to identify the
authentic rules of African societies in the form of
so-called customary law or tradition that they
described in ethnographies. It has emerged, how-
ever, that the characteristic colonial view of cus-
tom or tradition in Africa as a static, codified
corpus was not altogether accurate. It implied that
African societies had been frozen in time and ruled
by unchanging custom, but there is every reason
to doubt that this was ever so.
What we call “tradition” in African societies
before colonial times was not so much a body of
rules as a way of justifying change. Justice was not
in reality dispensed by the application of a fixed
code of traditional laws. It was the prerogative,
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rather, of a ruler acting in accordance with what-
ever could be represented as tradition. In almost
every case, the correct application of “tradition” was
inextricable from spiritual beliefs articulated by rit-
ual experts or priests. The latter thus in effect had
a role as guarantors of constitutional checks and
balances on a ruler, since they could legitimize or
disqualify a ruler’s actions by pronouncing them as
traditional and, therefore, just.
It was precisely because law in precolonial African
societies often turned on individual actions and not
on a fixed code—and rules were indistinguishable
from rituals—that it was unsuitable for European
purposes in the late nineteenth century. The global-
ization of the belle époque, the period that ended in
1914, produced a new breed of bankers and busi-
nessmen prepared to loan or invest money anywhere
in the world. Large Western corporations found it
inconvenient to do business with the ever-shifting
population of African kings and big men. Diplomats
and bankers increasingly
needed a world governed
by rules that were enforce-
able by institutions. They
wanted to see Western-
style jurisdictions with
fixed boundaries estab-
lished everywhere, opening the whole world to busi-
ness. Where public authorities of this type did not
exist, they had to be encouraged.
In Africa, the establishment of colonial territo-
ries fulfilled this need. Bankers could lend money
to colonial governments that, unlike individual big
men, would guarantee the security of a loan over
long periods. Investors could seriously contemplate
putting money into mines and railways, safe in the
knowledge that these assets were located in a spe-
cific territory that was party to international legal
conventions. These are the conditions necessary for
capitalist investment and production.
IN SEARCH OF AUTHENTICITY
Colonialism endowed Africa with legal-
bureaucratic government in the many places where
nothing fitting this description existed before, and it
strengthened the legal and bureaucratic elements in
cases where these already existed, such as in areas
ruled by Muslim sultans. Today, some analysts see
this form of government as a Western transplant that,
being imposed from outside, never really took root
in the African soil or coexisted with the supposedly
authentic African way of doing things. This is a
romantic point of view; it is also inaccurate.
It is true that every European colonial power did
indeed set up a centralized administration in each
colony and, to greater or lesser extent, incorporated
African rulers in systems of indirect rule. It is now
clear that in most cases this involved freezing many
of the dynamic processes of local government and,
also in many cases, permitted local rulers to dis-
pense with many of the more subtle checks and bal-
ances that had traditionally operated, producing
what the African scholar Mahmood Mamdani refers
to as “decentralized despotisms.” But, however
cruel, none of this was an assault on African authen-
ticity, a figment of more recent imagination. The
originators of authenticity were intellectuals of the
colonial period, both African and foreign. The lead-
ing political exponent of the concept was Mobutu
Sese Seko, the infamously corrupt dictator of Zaïre.
The institutions of legal-bureaucratic govern-
ment, introduced in most of Africa by colonial rule,
are now being hollowed out to produce the façade
states that we witness
today. This process, often
labeled “state failure,” is
certainly a cause of reduced
efficiency in governance.
From a politician’s point
of view, however, it offers
increased opportunity to exploit a gap between two
measures of reality.
On the one hand is a legal view, defined by
national and international law and norms, the basis
on which formal diplomatic relations are conducted.
On the other hand is the reality of political bargains
made between a leader in Africa and those whom he
(very rarely she) seeks to represent, include, or
assuage, paying particular attention to sectors where
capital is produced and reproduced. It is because of
the resulting gap between appearance and substance
that Northwestern University professor William
Reno refers to the existence of a “shadow state” in
Africa, a rather imperfect comparison inasmuch as it
is the shadow in the metaphor that actually contains
most of the substance. 
The creation of political capital out of the gap
between legal and social reality, already perceptible
in colonial times, has increased in importance since
the 1970s primarily because of the lack of resources
available to the official state apparatus. It is here
that the hollowed-out institutions of an African
state may become part of wider circuits of decep-
tion used by international operators who for one
reason or another wish to hide their activities
behind a screen of formality and law. These include
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Across much of Africa, a get-rich-quick and
enjoy-it-while-you-can mentality prevails.
powerful secret services, money launderers, off-
shore bankers, corporate lawyers, sanctions busters,
drug traffickers, arms smugglers, and others.
Ten years ago, I published an article in the journal
African Affairs showing in detail how this can work
in the case of one small country, the Seychelles.
There, in the 1980s, Italian money-launderers with
connections to the mafia and to Italian political par-
ties made common cause with drug traders, Ameri-
can covert warriors, South African sanctions busters,
and Middle Eastern political fixers, all under cover
of a sovereign state—in fact, one with a relatively
decent reputation for what is nowadays called “good
governance.” In the process the Seychelles became
one of the few African states to become literally crim-
inal, in the sense of drafting laws designed to evade
both its own and international legislation. 
CONFIDENCE AND CON MEN
In what many Africans think of as happier
times, there were examples of politicians who,
while being massively corrupt, were nevertheless
able to use the possibilities offered by their strate-
gic situation and historical legacy in the service of
political projects of general interest. A good exam-
ple is Félix Houphouët-Boigny, president of Ivory
Coast from 1960 to 1993, who for some two
decades oversaw what was known as “the Ivorian
miracle,” a period of spectacular economic growth
and development. Yet Houphouët-Boigny also
diverted state resources on a huge scale, using
them, for example, to build an imitation of the Vat-
ican’s St. Peter’s basilica in his home village. He
boasted openly about his Swiss bank accounts.
René Amany, a former head of Ivory Coast’s
cocoa marketing board, attempted to explain 
the paradox—a corrupt president who governed
with conspicuous success—when he recalled nos-
talgically in a 2004 newspaper interview how
Houphouët-Boigny “used money as a means of
advancing his political project, not politics as a
way of making money.” 
The corrupt use of a public position to make
money, which is then invested in political activities,
has also been noted in regard to Nigeria. Writing in
the May 2005 issue of Current History, the Nigerian
author Ike Okonta described how politics there is
“itself a struggle for control of the country’s oil
largesse, which, once secured in the form of loot, is
used to further and consolidate political ends. In
this struggle, the state and the means of violence at
its disposal are the ultimate spoils.”
It is interesting to speculate why the corruption
practiced in Ivory Coast during the 1960s and
1970s could be part of an internationally acclaimed
political and economic success story, whereas
twenty-first century Nigeria is widely regarded as a
potential giant tragically handicapped by corrup-
tion. The essential difference between the two cases
seems to lie not so much in the existence of cor-
ruption—present in both cases—as in the political
uses to which it is put. To be successful, any politi-
cal project has to inspire its supporters with gen-
uine hope and confidence. These are qualities in
short supply in Africa since the late 1970s, when
the bright vision of progress turned dim in so many
of the continent’s countries.
Arguably, it is the loss of hope and confidence
that makes corruption the scourge it is today.
Africans keep an estimated $150 billion of capital
offshore, money that could be used to develop the
continent if its owners had the confidence to invest
at home. Seventy thousand highly qualified Africans
leave their continent annually, excluding students
going abroad to study. Across much of Africa, a get-
rich-quick and enjoy-it-while-you-can mentality
prevails—an attitude fatal to stability, prosperity,
and long-term investment.
Africa in recent decades has become poorer, which
is an important incentive to corruption. But perhaps
more important, it has lost faith in the various 
projects of modernization and development that
promised Africans a better life in the mid-twentieth
century. Many mistook the outward signs of material
progress for the substance of development, at a time
when politicians in need of funds could milk cold
war rivalries. The disastrous economic and political
decline of the past 30 years has left Africans corre-
spondingly shocked and disillusioned. Here too lie
some of the roots of today’s corruption, as people
grasp at anything that will help them survive the
next day, month, or year in a world that seems
empty of longer-term hope.
Those states with something to sell—especially
oil—risk becoming what have been called “suc-
cessful failed states,” places that show all the
symptoms of failure but that are able to continue
indefinitely to the benefit of a corrupt ruling
clique and its friends overseas. According to the
US National Intelligence Council, “many African
leaders believe that the international economy is
still rigged so that Africans will never prosper.” As
long as this mood prevails, corruption in Africa
will continue. ■
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